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Development conflicts over mineral resources are fairly widespread
across the world, though often the debate on particular mining projects
tends to be polarized by activists on the one side (Gedicks 2001; Evans
and others 2001) and vehement industrialists on the other (Mikesell and
Whitney 1987; agi 2001). Indigenous communities in areas where min-
ing occurs often find themselves being pressured by both sides of the
political spectrum who feel that the communities’ allegiance would bring
greater legitimacy to the project.
A fierce debate over the mining of nickel has recently engulfed one of
Europe’s last remaining colonies, France’s tiny Melanesian archipelago of
New Caledonia. Although nearly 20,000 kilometers from Paris, New
Caledonia remains a French overseas territory—in effect a colony—since
it is neither a French département (the equivalent of a US state) nor
entirely autonomous. The territory, also known by its native name,
Kanaky, is located in the South Pacific between Fiji and Australia, about
1,500 kilometers northeast of mainland Australia (map 1). It has been on
the United Nations’ decolonization list for over twenty years and com-
prises a main island, Grande Terre, and the smaller Loyalty Islands of
Ouvéa, Lifou, and Maré off its eastern shore. Grande Terre, where the
capital city Nouméa is located, is only 400 kilometers long, yet is still one
of the largest South Pacific islands. Literally “Big Land,” Grande Terre is
also the location of nearly one quarter of the world’s entire known nickel
reserves. 
It did not take long for the French, who took control of the island in
1853, to begin exploiting the rich mineral resources. By the early 1990s,
liberalized restructuring allowed multinational mining conglomerates, as
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well as the indigenous Kanak population, to take part in the nickel ven-
tures that dominate the New Caledonian economy. But because nickel
mining tends to have environmental and social repercussions, it is not sur-
prising that opposition to nickel mines has increased dramatically in recent
years on this island where virtually no formal French or European Union
environmental regulations apply (Roberts 2001). The environmental costs
as well as the distribution of the economic benefits resulting from nickel
mining are the subjects of increasing conflict between social and cultural
groups in the territory. However, the level of resistance and indeed the
complementary level of cooperation vary considerably depending on the
location and type of extraction processes as well as the process of engage-
ment that corporations employ.
This article explores how resistance from indigenous groups, such as
the Kanak, is highly localized and influenced by the specific ecology of the
region and the social context in which the ecosystem is perceived to be
threatened. Resistance in such contexts is more complex than a linear
model predicated on educational disparities or generic cultural differences
may suggest. We present two examples of ostensibly similar mining pro-
jects in different parts of the island and analyze the difference in resis-
tance in the two cases. Our findings suggest that development enterprises
on indigenous lands can succeed and meet mutually agreeable outcomes
if requisite measures of environmental and social performance are opera-
tionalized within the specific context of the region in question. 
Two major mining complexes are scheduled to begin production on
Grande Terre before the end of 2010, one near Goro and another at Koni-
ambo, both with significant investment from multinational mining com-
panies. In this essay we will analyze the ongoing conflicts over nickel min-
ing in New Caledonia by using these current projects as case studies from
which to examine the complex historical, social, political, and environ-
mental issues involved. 
Methodology
The selection of New Caledonia to exemplify divergent indigenous resis-
tance was based on its relatively anachronistic colonial circumstance as
well as the emergence of a strong and often militant indigenous rights
movement. If mineral development under these circumstances can be
reached amicably, then it is likely that important inductive insights can be
drawn. Lessons learned from our case analysis may thus be applicable in
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other cases of less acute colonial or postcolonial subjugation of indige-
nous movements. We followed a qualitative comparative case analysis to
understand the dynamics of resistance (Ragin 1989). We reviewed detailed
ethnographic studies, where possible, and conducted or consulted per-
sonal interviews of key stakeholders in the mineral development negotia-
tions as well as key players in the resistance movements. This was not
meant to be an anthropological study; rather it falls in the scholarly
domain of environmental planning, in which a conflict assessment is pre-
sented along with an integrative analysis of current events.
Visits to both mining sites as well as to some of the areas of projected
impact were also conducted. Interviews were transcribed as they were
conducted unless requested by the interviewees—in which case they were
transcribed later the same day. Insights gleaned from interviews are
embedded in the text rather than directly referenced due to the sensitiv-
ity of the issues discussed; most interviewees preferred to remain anony-
mous. Wherever possible, attempts were made to collect primary statistics
on cost of production, demographics, and environmental impact from the
sources that had conducted empirical studies for this purpose.
Overview of Nickel Mining in New Caledonia
Although nickel mining has captured some attention in France, it is by far
the most prominent issue in New Caledonia, where it dominates the econ-
omy, accounting for 93 percent of the territory’s exports (Alailima 2002).
Nickel is a hard metal used for protective plating and the production of
stainless steel and other alloys. The French have been mining nickel on
Grande Terre since 1874 (MAR 2001), and Société Le Nickel (sln), which
originally had its labor supplied by an infamous penal colony established
on the island a decade earlier, was founded in 1880. Interestingly enough,
sln was partly held by the infamous German armament manufacturer
Krupps Steel, and nickel was exported to Germany, with the knowledge
of French officials, throughout World War I and as late as 1939 (Burchett
1942). Gradually the nickel industry grew—as did Eramet’s profits—
thrusting this tiny South Pacific archipelago to the forefront of world
resource markets as the single largest producer of ferronickel (ie, an alloy
composed of nickel and iron) and the world’s third largest supplier of
nickel ore, behind Russia and Canada (Eaton 2002). New Caledonia is
also home to one of the world’s biggest nickel mines, located at Thio,
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which operates in coordination with the main island’s fourteen other oper-
ating mines to produce 30 percent of the world’s total nickel (Roberts
2001). 
Most of New Caledonia’s nickel is currently shipped overseas as
unrefined ore, but new developments in the territory plan to export a more
finished product to the growing metal markets in East Asia. In recent
years, fluctuating nickel prices have created an uncertain market, but
nickel ventures on the island continue to be profitable enough that new
mines are being planned. 
Environmental Impacts of Nickel Mining
Originally mined by French convicts, the nickel on Grande Terre is now
extracted with the use of massive machinery and chemicals, which is typ-
ical of mining projects the world over. Due to a pervasive lack of environ-
mental regulations coupled with irresponsible management, these mining
activities in the past have had deleterious effects on the land and people
of New Caledonia. Indeed, negative impacts of extractive resource enter-
prises have been documented elsewhere in the Pacific—Papua New
Guinea and Nauru being two well-known examples. 
In New Caledonia, residential areas are surprisingly close to nickel
operations, as a huge smelter looms over the city of Nouméa. Nickel itself
is carcinogenic, and, when dispersed as dust from a smelter, can be respon-
sible for a number of respiratory ailments. Tests have revealed that house-
hold dust in Nouméa contains three times as much nickel as the ore being
mined nearby (Alailima 2002). Heavy metal pollution has also been
recorded in the potable water supplies as well as in lagoons that surround
Grande Terre, which are major sources of food for the territory’s popu-
lation, who annually harvest some 4,000 tonnes of fish from it (Coumans
2002a). 
Although present and past mining ventures have raised some concerns,
those planned for the future have been subject to growing scrutiny on
environmental and social grounds. Grande Terre is surrounded by the
world’s second largest coral reef and the entire archipelago has been rec-
ognized as one of only a handful of Global Biodiversity Hotspots by Con-
servation International because of its extraordinarily high numbers of
endemic species. Mining operations have already had visibly destructive
impacts on the island’s ecosystems and only recently have environmental
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concerns spurred reclamation efforts at older mine sites on Grande Terre.
Approximately 500 million tonnes of tailings have been cleared thus far,
with 100 million of that originating from the mines at Thio, where miti-
gation efforts have just begun (LNC, 11 Dec 2002). However, new min-
ing projects may continue to threaten the territory’s unique ecosystems,
as estimates posit that a 20 percent expansion of mining in New Caledo-
nia would prove extremely detrimental, especially to the health of the reef
ecosystems (Roberts 2001). 
Aside from the chemicals used in ore processing, erosion is another of
mining’s deleterious effects on the New Caledonian environment. Natural
erosion is exacerbated by the mining process and, especially during heavy
rains, sediments pour into the coastal waters, suffocating the reef and
destroying marine ecosystems (Hopquin 2002). These very visible effects
on the air and water quality of coastal areas are also thought to have neg-
ative impacts on the development of tourism, the territory’s second largest
industry.
In 2001, the environmental group Corail Vivant initiated a proposal to
list the coral reef that surrounds Grande Terre as a World Heritage Site
(Serre 2005a). The proposal has since been delayed in part by political dis-
agreements in France and New Caledonia; in addition, unesco requires
a more thorough application than that originally compiled by Corail
Vivant, as well as assurances that local measures will be implemented to
protect the reef because the World Heritage designation is purely sym-
bolic. Currently, there are efforts underway to submit a politically accept-
able version that would classify only certain parts of the reef system.
Experts are currently analyzing parts of the reef with the unesco appli-
cation in mind (LNC, 26 Jan 2006). However, the success of the new appli-
cation is still uncertain because the French government is not committed
to providing the provinces with any real assistance for environmental
monitoring or enforcement, and local protections for the reef remain weak
(Serre 2005a).
Regulatory Framework 
Because New Caledonia is not an incorporated part of France, French reg-
ulations do not automatically apply in these islands, and the absence of
restrictions of any kind until about fifteen years ago has allowed nickel to
be recklessly extracted for decades. Laws created by the French govern-
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ment are applicable to all départements, but they only apply in overseas
territories if adopted by the local territorial governments. Thus far, New
Caledonia has largely neglected movement toward enacting any French
environmental regulations within the territory (Sarimin Boengkih, pers
comm, 12 Dec 2002).1 Responsibility for environmental management falls
almost exclusively on the local provincial governments and the Northern
Province. The provinces are free to adopt French environmental legislation
in whole or in part, but so far no province has opted to do so.
Currently no specific government organization is responsible for the
conservation of the archipelago’s coastal regions or extensive coral reef.
However, the French state is party to several international treaties such
as the marpol Convention (the Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion from Ships, 1973/1978), making for a complex yet anemic system of
regulations in the territory (Falconbridge nc 2001). Minimal impact stud-
ies must be compiled in application for any installation classée (a broad
category that includes everything from buildings to mines), but beyond
that nothing is required of companies planning large projects. In the view
of environmentalists, the absence of any enforceable environmental regu-
lation, combined with significant tax breaks offered by politicians in Paris,
has made the rich New Caledonian nickel reserves even more attractive to
large mining companies. 
Two Canadian mining companies that plan to begin nickel extraction
and processing on Grande Terre by 2010 have been granted their first
fifteen years of operation entirely tax-free and the following five years
at a 50 percent tax reduction (TMJ 2001). The world’s second largest
nickel mining company, the Toronto-based International Nickel Com-
pany (inco), is moving ahead with plans to develop an open-pit mine and
a hydrometallurgical extraction plant (using liquid reagents in the treat-
ment or reduction of ores) at Goro on the southern tip of Grande Terre,
amid widespread protests from both environmental and indigenous activ-
ists. A second project is a joint venture between Falconbridge, another
Canadian mining giant, and the Kanak company Société Miniere du Sud
Pacifique (smsp), which is scheduled to develop a mine at Koniambo, in
the relatively impoverished and underdeveloped Northern Province of the
main island. Currently, this planned pyrometallurgical project (depending
on the action of heat, such as smelting) at Koniambo boasts support from
both Kanak and environmental groups, who see it as a much more socially
and environmentally sound endeavor than that at Goro. 
368 the contemporary pacific • 18:2 (2006)
The Kanak Independence Movement and 
its Effects on the Nickel Industry
In recent years the dominant nickel sector of the New Caledonian econ-
omy has been the subject of several major transformations, brought about
by the continuing independence movement of the indigenous Kanak peo-
ple (Horowitz 2004). The most important changes have seen the Kanak
obtain a significant share in the nickel activities. In the 1980s, New Cale-
donia experienced social upheaval due to the efforts of militant, pro-inde-
pendence Kanak groups. This eventually led to new negotiations with the
French government that resulted in political and economic concessions.
The Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks) was the
organization at the forefront of this struggle, claiming to represent the
Kanak people, whose ranks include hundreds of tribal groups, speaking
twenty-eight different languages. The Kanak, who had long seen the
profits from natural resources leaving Grande Terre and had become an
impoverished minority in their own land, began to express their agitation
with the French colonialists. A spate of protests, boycotts, and strikes in
the mid-1980s disrupted mining ventures and turned violent when armed
Kanak insurgents took hostages and clashed with gendarmes. The turmoil
subsided with the signing of the 1988 Matignon Accord, which provided
for a political restructuring of New Caledonia into three provinces: the
Northern and Southern provinces on Grande Terre, and a third province
comprising the Loyalty Islands (see map 1). Table 1 compares the popu-
Table 1. A Comparison of the Northern and Southern Provinces 
of New Caledonia
Indicator Northern Province Southern Province
Total Population 44,470 (est; isee 2004) 164,230 (est; isee 2004)
Area 9,582.6 sq km 7,012 sq km
Ethnic makeup 
(% Kanak) 77.9% (1996 census) 25.5% (1996 census)
Number of functional
mines 10 4
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lation, area, and ethnic make-up for the two provinces on Grand Terre,
along with the number of nickel mines currently operational in each.
The Matignon Accord also devolved more responsibilities to these
regional governments and afforded the underdeveloped North and Loy-
alties provinces increased funding with which to manage them. The
Nouméa Accord, which gave even further autonomy to the territory, was
signed in May 1998 by Kanaks and French loyalists and was overwhelm-
ingly approved in a November 1998 referendum (Downer 1998). How-
ever, the latter also superseded the Matignon Accord by postponing a
1998 independence referendum for ten to fifteen years.2
The Matignon Accord also set the stage for economic reorganization
in New Caledonia, which began to concentrate more economic authority
into the hands of Kanaks. The first change in the existing structure of the
nickel industry was the sale of the smsp company in April 1990. Jacques
Lafleur, the conservative president of the Southern Province and current
leader of the anti-independence, pro-French political group, Rally for
Caledonia in the Republic (rcpr), sold the company to the Northern
Province, home to a primarily Kanak population, for us$20 million
(Fraser 2001). Once under Kanak control, the Société Minière du Sud
Pacifique made astonishing progress under its head, Raphael Pidjot, who,
before taking the smsp post, had been an active independence leader,
flnks chief of staff, and later a close associate of the late Kanak nation-
alist, Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Under Pidjot’s direction, smsp made great
strides and grew to control a large portion of the territory’s nickel
resources. Pidjot (who died in late November 2000 in a helicopter acci-
dent) also successfully lobbied the French government, with the help of
Kanak activists who once again obstructed mining activities, to grant
concessions of nickel deposits to smsp. The largest of these concessions
was at Koniambo, an extraordinarily rich reserve where the company is
beginning to develop a large mine complex and smelter in cooperation
with Canadian mining conglomerate Falconbridge. Paris officials, who
had also restructured the ownership of Eramet’s subsidiary in New Cale-
donia, facilitated the smsp acquisition of Koniambo deposit. By making
such changes in favor of smsp, which has been called “the economic arm
of the independence movement” in the territory (Madoef 1996), the for-
mer left-leaning French government attempted to quell the growing agi-
tation of Kanak nationalists, who had renewed their activities in the
1990s. The government of France, which then owned 55 percent of Era-
met through a holding company called erap, or Entreprise de recherche
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et d’activités pétrolières (Golding 1997), was able to force an unfavorable
swap that gave Koniambo to smsp in exchange for inferior deposits near
Poum, despite vocal opposition from foreign shareholders such as US
investment funds Fidelity and Templeton. In July 1999, sln, the oldest
nickel company in the territory, was restructured to reduce Eramet’s share
of the company from 90 percent to 60 percent. Another 10 percent was
sold to Nisshin Steel of Japan and the remaining 30 percent was trans-
ferred to the Kanak through a new company, Société Territoriale Calé-
donienne de Participation Industrielle. sln, which is seeking to expand
its operations by 25 percent, currently operates four open-pit mines and
the island’s only active smelter at Doniambo near Nouméa. However, if
the two major projects—that of inco at Goro and the joint Falcon-
bridge /smsp venture at Koniambo—go ahead as planned, then the sln
smelter will then be only one of three in the territory. 
Background on the Goro Project
inco, one of the world’s largest nickel producers, is currently in the early
stages of developing a mine and hydrometallurgical plant through its sub-
sidiary Goro Nickel sa near Goro in southern Grande Terre. According
to Laurence Kuntz, the Goro Nickel communications officer whom Gre-
wal interviewed in Nouméa on 11 October 2002, the company was aim-
ing to start production in the second quarter of 2004,3 but we were later
informed via e-mail by William Napier, inco vice president for environ-
ment and health, that production had been delayed due to a reevaluation
of the project because of rising costs and labor disputes (pers comm, 29
July 2004).4 Laurent Chatenay, director of community relations at Goro
Nickel, detailed the ownership scheme during our meeting with him in
Nouméa (7 Jan 2005): inco presently controls 69 percent of the Goro
development, while 21 percent is held by a consortium of Japanese com-
panies that includes Sumitomo and Mitsui. The remaining 10 percent,
which was previously owned by the French government through its
Bureau de Recherches Géologique et Minières, was recently distributed
among the territory’s three provinces, with 5 percent going to the South-
ern Province and 2.5 percent to each of the Northern and Loyalty Islands
provinces (Serre 2005b). With the cost of the entire endeavor estimated
at us$1.4 billion, inco secured a us$200-million bond in March 2001
(MAR 2001), and is in the process of garnering further funding. The
deposit at Goro is estimated to contain “370 Mt [million tonnes] averag-
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ing 1.6 percent nickel and 0.17 percent cobalt, including proven and
probable reserves of 47 Mt” (MAR 2000). inco estimates Goro’s annual
production capacity to be 54,000 tonnes of nickel and 5,400 tonnes of
cobalt and the mine is expected to produce a nickel oxide project con-
taining 78 percent nickel and a cobalt carbonate product destined for
stainless steel and cobalt markets in China, South Korea, and Taiwan
(Coumans 2002a).
inco highlights job creation and employment training as two aspects
of the project beneficial for New Caledonians. Its press releases report that
the company will strictly abide by iso (International Organization for
Standardization) 14000 standards related to environmental management,
and that it has already spent over us$5 million in efforts to prepare the
indigenous peoples for jobs at the site (inco 2001). The company also
claims that the project will supply 800 jobs and 1,500 derivative jobs, 90
percent of which will “likely” be filled by New Caledonians (inco 2002),
although Jean-Philippe Gibaud, Goro Nickel’s director of environment,
indicated that inco has ruled out any favorable hiring policy for the
indigenous people (interview with Ali and Grewal, Nouméa, 7 Jan 2005).5
However, it is doubtful whether even placing Kanaks in management posi-
tions at Goro would quiet critics of the project, because various factors
analyzed later in this article. The recently renewed mining operations at
Goro were halted at the beginning of February 2005 by protestors from
Rhéébù Nùù, an umbrella organization representing the various environ-
mental and indigenous groups opposed to the development. After being
forcibly removed by police, the protesters subsequently marched through
Nouméa, where they met with government and company officials (Fréd-
ière 2005c). Thus far, their main demand for a review of the project by
an independent body has not been met, so the potential for similar dis-
ruptions remains. 
The Prony Concession
In July 2002, the Southern Province government took the unexpected
step of granting inco a six-year exploration permit to an approximately
8,300 hectares area near Prony (Van Peteghem 2002), adjacent to their
Goro site, at the minimal cost of about us$22 million (Coumans 2002b).
In December 2003, Goro Nickel obtained the official “research permit”
for which other companies had also applied (William Napier, pers comm,
29 July 2004). As Southern Province law allows (Province Sud 2003), the
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permit was granted almost directly by the president of the Southern Prov-
ince, who at the time was political strongman Jacques Lafleur. This move,
called the “Prony Concession,” has the potential to increase the output at
Goro project by up to 180,000 tonnes per year (Coumans 2002b). It has
been seen as detrimental to the environment because it greatly expands
the area of land open to mining activities on Grande Terre. It is also
viewed as a threat to the viability of the Koniambo project, for a mine of
this magnitude could undercut the costs of production and outcompete
the Northern mine. In response to the Prony Concession, an umbrella
group called the Collective for Defense and Control of the Prony Heritage
was formed by numerous environmental, political, and social organiza-
tions to advocate for a reversal of these rights issued to Goro Nickel. The
collective led marches and demonstrations in late 2002. The exploration
permit for Prony, granted during the Lafleur administration, has since
been suspended by a new government elected in May 2004 and is cur-
rently pending a review. Jean-Michel N’guyen, Goro’s assistant director
of environment, told us during a 10 January 2005 interview in Nouméa
that Goro Nickel has thus stopped its exploratory drilling in the region,
pending a final decision from the Southern Province government.
The Opposition to Goro
Before the Prony Concession cemented opposition to the Goro project,
both environmentalists and indigenous Kanaks had already positioned
themselves against inco and its governmental supporters in Paris and
Nouméa. They had been continuing their call for an independent envi-
ronmental review of the project as well as an extension to the one-month
public comment period on inco’s more than 2,100-page project assess-
ment to more fully examine the lengthy document (inco 2002). On 21
November 2001, Kanak leaders from the Djubea Kapune area, near the
Goro site, presented to French Secretary of State Christian Paul a pro-
posal to postpone final approval of the project so as to provide adequate
time to prepare a comprehensive impact report. Sylvain Pabouty (now a
leading member of the Parti de Liberation Kanak, or Palika) said that as
work at the site was beginning, Kanaks from the Goro area were still
searching for a group of experts to provide independent and ongoing
analysis of the expected impacts at the mine site (interview with Grewal,
Nouméa 16 Oct 2002).6 Along with the Senat Coutumier (Customary
Senate), which represents the voice of the Kanak people, local Kanak
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tribes are opposing the project on the grounds that pollutants generated
by the nickel complex would threaten their traditional hunting and fish-
ing and pose serious risks to the health of their members. Outside of Nou-
méa, many people, mostly Kanaks, continue to lead a quasi-traditional
lifestyle that is heavily dependent on fishing and subsistence agriculture;
thus any threat to the marine and terrestrial ecosystems could have grave
and widespread consequences.
Many New Caledonians, especially Kanaks, are also concerned about
profits from the Goro project leaving the territory, because currently the
local stake in Goro Nickel is small and the companies involved have been
granted extensive tax holidays. Further, “France has agreed to finance
[us]$350 million of the project’s direct costs” (Kuck 2004). The tax
breaks, also offered to Falconbridge/smsp, assure no revenues for local
government for at least fifteen years, limiting the potential benefits of the
project to merely employment opportunities. However, it is unclear who
will get the jobs created by the Goro project. inco /Goro Nickel cur-
rently participate in a number personnel training projects (none of which
is completely funded or operated by them), in which 179 students are cur-
rently enrolled (William Napier, pers comm, 29 July 2004). Many skilled
teams from Australia and other foreign nations were hired by Bechtel,
Technip, and Hatch (bth), the contractor that was building the complex
for Goro Nickel, and the company planned to import approximately
3,000 foreign laborers. A labor dispute between bth and Goro Nickel
regarding the complexities and expenses of constructing the project led to
a breakup of this corporate partnership, but William Napier informed us
that inco /Goro Nickel aims to rehire all previous bth employees (pers
comm, 29 July 2004). Needless to say, Goro Nickel has attracted further
criticism since it announced its intention to import labor. Laurence Kuntz
said that most of these workers are expected to be Filipinos or other
skilled laborers such as pipe fitters and instrumentalists, specialties that are
not prevalent among the New Caledonian workforce; she also said these
positions are short-term, lasting about three years, and the company wants
to provide more permanent employment for the local people (interview
with Grewal, Goro mine site, 11 Oct 2002). However, even short-term
work is better than none at all, and according to Sarimin Boengkih (pers
comm, 12 Dec 2002), Goro Nickel had known for years that these jobs
were required and had ample time to provide appropriate training to
locals for these positions. Boengkih was also quick to point out that the
plan to import labor, and even the operation of foreign companies in New
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Caledonia, is in direct conflict with UN Resolution 35/118, that is, the
Plan of the Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Although
France is in violation of almost every provision of this resolution and other
similar UN anti-colonial resolutions, annexes 6 and 9 are of particular
relevance to mining in New Caledonia. Annex 6 declares that establish-
ment and operation of foreign ventures in the territories should be pro-
hibited, while annex 9 provides that UN member states should “discour-
age or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into
Territories under colonial domination” (UN 1980, 2). Furthermore, con-
cerns have been expressed over the potential spread of diseases that can
be exacerbated through migrant labor flows, such as hiv/aids (an unfor-
tunately common phenomenon in closed industrial towns). 
Environmentalists are also firmly against inco’s proposed development
due to its potential for environmental degradation. The three environ-
mental nongovernmental organizations that have been voicing their oppo-
sition to the project’s plans are Corail Vivant, Point Zero, and Koné Avenir
(see table 2). Corail Vivant, literally “living coral,” is primarily concerned
with the health and welfare of the coral massif that surrounds Grande
Terre. Point Zero (formerly Action Biosphere), is opposed to mining devel-
opment in the region, but sees Goro’s plan as worse than Koniambo’s
because of the risks related to hydrometallurgical processing. Koné Avenir
focuses on promoting increased development and environmental man-
agement in the Koné area. These three organizations believe that the toxic
runoff from Goro could damage the reef and have detrimental impacts on
local people and tourism in New Caledonia. Recently, these environmen-
tal groups have joined with local Kanak organizations to form the Rhéébù
Nùù committee to spearhead opposition to the Goro project. However,
despite the cohesion provided by Rhéébù Nùù, the groups do not entirely
agree on how to proceed in opposing inco’s planned development at
Goro. 
Within the last few years an extensive international network of peoples
in communities affected by mining activities has arisen, including many
so-called “fourth-world” indigenous groups like the Kanak. These groups
are in contact with one another, support each other’s campaigns, and write
to politicians expressing their unity and opposition to potentially destruc-
tive ventures. In the case of Goro, groups from India and Indonesia have
sent letters to officials in New Caledonia stating their solidarity with local
Kanak chiefs and their disapproval of the project. The Kanak are also
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supported by the Innu of Canada, who ultimately reached an agreement
with inco to allow the company to begin mining activities adjacent to
their homes near Voisey’s Bay in Eastern Labrador. 
inco has been active in nickel operations in New Caledonia for
decades; it has operated on Grande Terre since 1982 at the Tiébaghi chro-
mite deposit, of which it owns 55 percent (MAR 2001), and since 1984 at
the Pomalaa East nickel deposit. Although the Goro project continues to
have the strong support of politicians in both Nouméa and Paris, because
of the minimal local stake in the Goro project, it lacks the legitimacy of
its rivals Société Le Nickel, which has been operating on Grande Terre for
over one hundred years, and Falconbridge, which is partnered with the
Table 2. Environmental Groups Involved in the Resistance Movement 
in New Caledonia
Name of Position on Mining 
Group Focus of Activism Funding Sources Development
Corail Vivant Listing coral reef as Private sources Koniambo is less of an 
World Heritage Site, in region environment problem 
ensuring environ- than Goro, which 
mental protections poses great threats to 
at Goro, urging the health of the ter-
return of Prony restrial ecosystems as 
Concession well as to the coral 
reefs that surround 
Grande Terre. 
Point Zero Opposing Goro Environmental Koniambo’s pyro-
(formerly Project and Prony Defense Fund metallurgical process 
Action Concession (US) poses risks such as 
Biosphere) carbon dioxide emis-
sions but is preferable 
to Goro’s hydrometal-
lurgical process.
Koné Avenir Advocating develop- Private sources Primarily concerned 
ment and environ- in region with Koniambo, 
mental protection although it views 
in Koné area Goro as a dangerous 
project.
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local company, smsp. inco has also provoked concern over its practices
by maintaining a relative lack of transparency regarding its plans for
the development. The company delayed the release of its project report,
including an environmental assessment, and, as mentioned earlier, allowed
a period of only one month for public response period to its 2,100-page
document. The report has also been criticized for being created in an office
thousands of kilometers from New Caledonia and for the quality of its
translation into French (Borsa [2002]).7 In 2001, a group of concerned
New Caledonians, including environmentalists and senior Kanak mem-
bers of the Senat Coutumier, was denied a copy of the “Bankable Feasi-
bility Study” that included an initial environmental impact assessment,
even after traveling to inco’s Toronto headquarters (De Santis 2001). 
Environmental Concerns over Goro
inco’s perceived evasiveness and its initial refusal to release the environ-
mental impact assessment only heightened concerns over the anticipated
ecological effects of the project. inco’s president, Scott Hand, claimed,
“inco intends to put in place a world class environmentally sound oper-
ation” (AMM 2000). Indeed, inco has had some notable success in envi-
ronmental remediation, particularly in improving the conditions around
the smelting areas of Sudbury, Ontario, Canada. However, the actual envi-
ronmental assessment of the Goro project reveals many ecological risks
that have been differentially noted by the indigenous population and activ-
ists, in contrast with the Koniambo project. 
The wastes from inco’s proposed mine at Goro are the most signifi-
cant cause for concern to environmentalists and indigenous groups in
New Caledonia because of their destructive potential to native fauna and
flora and their contaminant effects on air and water. inco plans to imple-
ment a “proprietary hydrometallurgical and solvent extraction process
technology” (TMJ 2001). This is similar to a technique called Pressure Acid
Leach, which separates the nickel from the surrounding material with sul-
furic acid and extremely high pressure, through the use of an autoclave.
The disposal of the wastes generated by this hydrometallurgical extraction
process poses the greatest environmental risks. The submarine effluent dis-
posal system for liquid wastes and the high concentration of hazardous
materials produced at Goro are extremely problematic in the eyes of many
New Caledonians. While tailings (solids) will be disposed of on land in
the Kwe Basin at the convergence of three rivers where a dam will be con-
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structed in an effort to confine the pollutants, wastewater (effluents) from
the development will be deposited directly into the ocean (Goro Nickel
2002).
Contamination of water supplies and marine ecosystems is a common
effect of mining activities, due to the toxicity of the compounds used in
ore extraction. In the case of Goro, there are legitimate fears about chem-
icals and heavy metals from the hydrometallurgical extraction process
employed at the mine entering local waters. An analysis of inco’s pro-
ject assessment by Corail Vivant reveals the concentrations of these met-
als carried in the runoff from Goro to be significantly higher than those
allowed by French law. Concentrations of the extremely carcinogenic
metal chromium, could reach 0.5 milligrams per liter, even though French
restrictions only permit up to 0.1 mg/l.8 Activists Bruno van Peteghem
and Jean-Jacques Paponaud told Grewal in an interview in Nouméa on 8
October 2002 that environmental groups perceive these high levels of
chromium (particularly the extremely toxic hexavalent chromium, or Cr6)
in the wastewater, which could reach up to 0.1 mg/l, to be the greatest
threat to the fragile ecosystems surrounding the Goro site. Goro Nickel
has requested an exemption from regulations restricting the manganese
concentration in the effluents deposited into the lagoon. The company has
been granted preliminary approval, allowing its effluents to reach a con-
centration of 100 mg/l, which is 100 times the current standard of 1 mg/l.
Since the effects of high levels of manganese on the marine environment
are uncertain, the Southern Province government is requiring the com-
pany to provide impact reports before it will grant this exemption from
the regulation. This is a crucial issue to the project because the costs
required to bring the wastes into accordance with the current restrictions
on manganese concentrations would be significant; Goro’s Jean-Michel
N’guyen told us that the manganese problem might be serious enough to
endanger the economic viability of the project (interview with Ali and
Grewal, Nouméa and Goro, 10 Jan 2005).
Besides chromium, other heavy metals such as lead, mercury, and
arsenic are typically the most dangerous waste products from mines; all of
these will be contained in the effluents exiting the site. The pH levels of the
wastewaters must also be closely monitored because of the acids involved
in the extraction processes. Temperature is another problem: the effluents
will be at least 35 degrees Celsius, which is higher than the 30-degree limit
imposed by Southern Province regulations regarding liquid discharges
from installations classées (Province Sud 2003). These toxic discharges,
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noted in inco’s report, have led environmentalists and other groups to
keep a close eye on the Goro plan. On 10 August 2002, the French Insti-
tut National de l’Environnement et des Risques (ineris) released con-
clusions about its review of the Goro report, uncovering inaccurate infor-
mation on both the company’s estimated chemical pollution and the
effects of waste metals on the environment, and highlighting thirty-seven
other problems regarding the development. William Napier has asserted
that Goro Nickel “will implement all the recommendations proposed by
ineris” (pers comm, 29 July 2004), which cover a wide range of sub-
jects, from safety to environmental protection. Overall, the ineris study
emphasized the necessity of implementing the precautions contained in its
study prior to further work at the site. 
Air pollution is another major concern at Goro, as carbon dioxide, the
primary greenhouse gas, will be produced at Goro at a rate of about 1.2
million tonnes per year, or over 5 tonnes annually for every individual in
the territory (Environnement: Nouvelle-Calédonie 2003, 15). The 110-
megawatt coal-burning power plant that will power the mine operations
and consume some 600,000 tonnes of coal annually will account for the
significant carbon dioxide emissions (Goro Nickel nd, 16). There are fur-
ther concerns over the type of coal to be used in these power plants; as the
territory has no regulations on emissions, activist Jacky Mermoud, for-
merly of Action Biosphere and now working with Point Zero, expressed
concern that coal from Australia with particularly high sulfur content may
be used (interview with Grewal, Nouméa, 16 Oct 2002). Furthermore,
Goro Nickel’s environmental specialist, Jean-Michel N’guyen, showed us
during a site tour on 10 January 2005 that the power plant will be located
directly across an access road (approximately ten meters wide) from the
Forêt du Nord, one of several forest reserves flanking the site that are
threatened by the atmospheric pollution from the plant. 
To combat erosion and biodiversity loss, Goro Nickel has established
a nursery at Goro, according to a company advertisement in the maga-
zine, Environnement: Nouvelle-Calédonie (Goro Nickel 2003). The mas-
sive revegetation efforts will require 100,000 plants each year and include
the reestablishment of local plant species, such as eight species of Gym-
nostoma (Casuarinaceae family) that are native to New Caledonia. How-
ever, during our tour of the site, N’guyen pointed out the shortcomings
of the small nursery, which currently produces only 20,000 plants annu-
ally; this raises questions about the company’s level of commitment to
revegetation, in this region of extraordinary endemism and biodiversity.
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Besides the environmental concerns, the proposed hydrometallurgical
extraction system would allow Goro Nickel to produce nickel at a cost of
less than us$1.00 per pound, easily outcompeting rival mining companies
on Grande Terre. Further, if Goro Nickel ever begins to exploit the Prony
deposit, competitors like sln and Falconbridge/smsp, which produce
nickel at about us$1.55 and $1.20 per pound respectively (Squillario
2002), could face serious difficulties. 
Beginning in mid-2002, the Goro project experienced a series of dis-
ruptions that have recently resulted in a work stoppage that lasted nearly
two years.9 Rising costs, which are estimated to be as high as 45 percent
more than previously anticipated (Hiscock 2002), along with recent labor
and subsequent contract disputes have culminated in this major setback
for the development. On 5 December 2002, inco announced its inten-
tions to “undertake a comprehensive review of the project” in light of ris-
ing cost estimates (William Napier, pers comm, 29 July 2004). In October
2004, after a favorable review of the project, inco reaffirmed its com-
mitment to the development and restarted its work at Goro in February
2005, with full production expected by the end of 2007 (Béligon 2004).
When work resumed, demonstrators from the Rhéébù Nùù committee,
demanding an independent environmental review of the project, block-
aded the access roads and forced closure of the site that lasted several
days. In the meantime, according to Goro Communications Director
Catherine Guillaume, Goro Nickel has begun construction work on the
port complex amid uncertainty regarding future demonstrations (Maclel-
lan 2005). Recently, though, Philippe Gomes, president of the Southern
Province, promised another environmental review. However, this new
study will only analyze certain parts of project, like the effluent discharges,
and Sarimin Boengkih indicated that it is not comprehensive enough in its
scope to satisfy local activists (Maclellan 2005). 
The Plan for the Koniambo Deposit
The Koniambo project finds itself in a very different social and political
context than that at Goro, due to its location, ownership, and the fact
that it is a pyrometallurgical, rather than hydrometallurgical project. The
project, near Koné in the Northern Province, is expected to bring much-
needed economic activity to the underdeveloped region. The acquisition
of the deposit by smsp came about due to intense pressure from Kanak
activists who obstructed exports from sln mines and forced the French
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government to make concessions by ceding control of some of Grande
Terre’s richest nickel deposits in the form of lopsided swaps favoring
smsp. The trades from sln prior to the restructuring of its ownership
were contingent on smsp finding a partner with whom to develop the
sites (Fraser 2001); when smsp enlisted Falconbridge as its partner in the
venture, the French government pushed the deal through, and even forced
the removal of Eramet’s chairman, Yves Rambaud, who opposed the trade
(Golding 1997). In 1997, the rich nickel reserve at Koniambo was signed
over to smsp in exchange for far inferior deposits at Poum. The deposit,
which comprised approximately 25 to 30 percent of the Eramet’s reserves,
contains about 151 million tonnes of minerals at an average 2.58 percent
nickel (Falconbridge nc sas 2002, 41–43). smsp currently has a major-
ity stake of 51 percent in the venture while Falconbridge accounts for the
remaining 49 percent (Zenati 1998). The 1998 Bercy Accord, which trans-
ferred the reserve at Koniambo from sln to Falconbridge/smsp, stipu-
lated that the companies would have to invest us$100 million in the pro-
ject prior to 1 January 2006 or the deposit would revert back to sln
control (Frédière 2005a). Falconbridge finalized its commitment to the
project in December 2005 after reviewing its plans for Koniambo in light
of rising costs, which had exceeded previous estimates by up to half a bil-
lion US dollars. Exchange rate fluctuations (gains by the euro and Aus-
tralian dollar versus the US dollar) have accounted for much of the cost
increases. Michel Rioux, Falconbridge’s director of human resources and
government and community relations, detailed the cost overruns to Gre-
wal in an interview in Nouméa on 12 January 2005, explaining that Fal-
conbridge scaled down its infrastructure investments to cut costs. The
size of the large, deepwater port originally planned for the site has been
reduced significantly, and instead of constructing a dam to meet the site’s
water needs, the revised plans call for a desalinization plant. These along
with other changes to the Koniambo development plans have required
new feasibility studies, impact assessments, and permits, all of which have
contributed to delaying final approval of the project. The start date for
construction at the site has also been pushed back because of funding
issues. Falconbridge and smsp expect project construction to take forty-
three months, with full production to begin shortly thereafter (Frédière
2005b). A smelter and a series of open-pit, mountaintop mines are set to
produce ferronickel and have a yearly output of 60,000 tonnes, with the
first exports expected sometime toward the end of 2009 (Falconbridge
nc /smsp 2003; Béligon 2005). 
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Support for and Opposition to Koniambo
A key aspect of the Koniambo project is its anticipated beneficial impact
on the territory’s economy. If the development proceeds as planned, it
will significantly increase Kanak economic participation. This may have
motivated French loyalists in government, like Lafleur and his fellow
rcpr members, to grant Goro Nickel the Prony Concession, which could
counter the effects of the Koniambo project on the territory’s economy.
For these same reasons, Kanak groups generally support the Koniambo
development. smsp, which owns five limonitic nickel mines and purchased
Nickel Mining Corporation along with its Kouaoua deposit in early 2000,
already exports 70,000 tonnes of unrefined nickel per year from Doni-
ambo (MAR 2000). Thus, when coupled with the sln’s reorganization,
the development at Koniambo could very well have shifted much of the
nickel resources in the territory to the control of Kanak companies, if it
were not for the recently expanded potential for the Goro project.
There are concerns that Koniambo may be destructive to the environ-
ment because it requires the construction of massive infrastructure as well
as a 250-megawatt coal-fueled power plant, which will burn an estimated
887,000 tonnes of coal per year (Falconbridge nc sas 2001, 41), almost
one and a half times the amount to be consumed at Goro (Goro Nickel
nd, 16). Martin Boucher, the former director of human resources and
government and community relations at Falconbridge’s New Caledonian
subsidiary, told Grewal in a 14 October 2002 interview in Koné that the
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from the Koniambo plant will be reduced
through the use of 20,500 tonnes per year of limestone, but the emissions
are still anticipated to be higher than those released from the plant at
Goro. 
Revised project plans, which have eliminated the dam and reduced the
port area, may decrease the overall environmental impact of the develop-
ment. However, apprehensions regarding the mine’s impact on local
waterways and marine ecosystems remain. Kanaks who live in the sur-
rounding villages have expressed concern about erosion and siltation of
local rivers, and also about increased fishing competition due to popula-
tion growth associated with the mine activity (Horowitz 2002). Falcon-
bridge/smsp also plans to dredge a shipping lane for large vessels through
a portion of the lagoon and reef, which will certainly damage the marine
ecosystem. The recent inclusion of a desalinization plant also presents
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new ecological risks, which have yet to be scrutinized by the environmen-
tal groups on Grande Terre. 
However, attention to the environmental impacts of the Koniambo
project seems minimal, with most environmental groups focusing on the
potential damage from the hydrometallurgical process to be implemented
at Goro. The Koniambo project will implement a pyrometallurgical pro-
cessing plant, in which the extracted ores are placed directly into a furnace
and the waste generated is slag, which is deposited on land before it hard-
ens into a glassy rock-like substance. This process is substantially different
from the hydrometallurgical processes intended to be used at the Goro
site, where liquid effluents will be deposited in the surrounding lagoon.
The potential for pollution and contamination is much higher at a hydro-
metallurgical project like Goro because of the hazardous metals content
of the tailings as well as the pH level and temperature of the effluents.
Thus, the pyrometallurgical Koniambo project is considered much safer
and is favored by environmentalists over the hydrometallurgical Goro
development. Although much of the slag will have to be stockpiled at the
mine site, Martin Boucher told Grewal that Falconbridge will try to mar-
ket its slag internationally to be used in asphalt production (interview,
Koné, 14 Oct 2002). Michel Rioux of Falconbridge also told Grewal that
they have not ruled out the possibility of implementing a hydrometallur-
gical plant in the future to process limonitic ores that are unable to be
extracted pyrometallurgically (interview, Nouméa, 12 Jan 2005). The
companies developing the Koniambo project have been praised by envi-
ronmentalists for their openness in communicating the details and envi-
ronmental impacts of the development to the public, exemplified by their
thorough environmental study. 
In sum, then, there appears to be united opposition to Goro and sup-
port for Koniambo, although the Falconbridge /smsp project still faces
some opposition from environmentalists and Kanak alike. However, Fal-
conbridge /smsp’s response to the opposition has generally managed to
quell large-scale discontentment regarding the project. Two salient exam-
ples of this involved the discussion about siting a refinery and a dam and
reservoir to provide water for cooling of machinery. The proposed
refinery site was supported by the customary landowners but opposed by
the Kanak cattle cooperatives, who filed a legal challenge. The company
engaged both parties constructively and eventually chose an alternative
site. In the case of the dam and reservoir, customary landowners opposed
the site, which was proposed for the most technically feasible area, due
to concerns about flooding of hunting terrain as well as for the location’s
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historical and spiritual significance. In this case also, after initial negotia-
tions revealed the importance of the proposed site to the community, the
company agreed to locate the dam in a technically more difficult area
(Horowitz 2002).
The local environmental group Koné Avenir wants smsp and Falcon-
bridge to do more to foster development in the surrounding communities.
Members of Koné Avenir are wary of the environmental destruction
already wrought by past nickel mining and the economic hardship that
followed the nickel booms of the late 1960s and 1970s. Aside from mon-
itoring the environmental impacts such as sedimentation downstream
from the mine, Koné Avenir wants the companies to invest in local
employment and regional infrastructure.
Larger-scale opposition to the Koniambo project, however, will likely
arise once Falconbridge/smsp formally announces its plans to import
about 1,500 foreign laborers on temporary contracts to construct the
complex. However, unlike Goro Nickel, Martin Boucher said that Fal-
conbridge/smsp has a timeline to phase out all non–New Caledonian
employees, so that by the time the mine is in its fifth year of operation no
more than 100 expatriate employees will remain (interview with Grewal,
Koné, 14 Oct 2002).
Thus, at present, despite complaints by some local environmental
groups, support for the Koniambo project among Kanaks and indigenous
organizations such as the Senat Coutumier and the flnks remains strong;
Regis Vendegou, the senate’s secretary-general, said that people are con-
fident because of the ownership scheme that much of the profits from the
development will remain within the territory (interview with Grewal,
Nouméa, 10 Oct 2002).
The difference in responses of the Kanak community to the two pro-
jects reflects a combination of cautious and differentiated pragmatism
rather than the positional resistance that is often assumed by many envi-
ronmental activists.
Divergent Decisions: Lesson for Mineral Developers
inco announced on 11 October 2005 that it was planning to acquire Fal-
conbridge in a friendly takeover offer of us$12.5 billion, creating the
world’s largest nickel company (inco 2005). Meanwhile, Teck-Cominco,
another major Canadian mining company, made an offer to acquire
inco (without Falconbridge) in May 2006, while European regulators
are still considering the Falconbridge deal for approval. If completed, this
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deal would invite some valuable empirical analysis in organizational
change, because, as we have noted, the two companies have very different
approaches to conflict management. Table 3 shows the key differences
and similarities between the two projects based on our analysis. There are
clearly some quantitative differences between the economic returns for
the Kanak. This may lead some economic determinists to simplistically
assume that economic returns are the key deciding factors regarding the
formation of resistance movements. However, in-depth investigation of
the projects reveals that the decision-making by the majority of the Kanak
community follows a more complex and long-term planning process for
the articulation of their indigenous rights. Indeed, the Koniambo project
also faced opposition and there was a convoluted process of decision-
making and the articulation of resistance, as noted by some recent anthro-
pological studies of the project (Horowitz 2002). However, the resistance
was principled rather than positional and could thus be addressed through
appropriate negotiations and concessions—the onus for which lay with
the mineral developer. 
Table 3. A Comparison of the Goro and Koniambo Projects
Indicator Goro Koniambo
Reserve 370 million tonnes 151 million tonnes
Ore grade 1.60% 2.58%
Ownership 69% inco (Canada) 49% Falconbridge 
21% Sumitomo/Mitsui ( Japan) (Canada)
5% NC Southern Province 51% smsp (North-
2.5% NC Northern Province ern Province)
2.5% NC Loyalty Islands Province
Labor required 803 local 850 local
and origin 3,000 (temp. contract) imported ~1,500 (tentative) 
imported
Tax deal 15 years tax free, then next 15 years tax free, 
5 years at 50% reduction then next 5 years 
at 50% reduction
Cost of production Less than us$1.00 per pound us$1.20 per pound
Ore extraction Hydrometallurgical Pyrometallurgical 
process (for now)
Environmental Submarine tailings disposal Emissions, water 
concerns usage
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Some key lessons can be gleaned from these two cases, for mineral
developers and governments alike, with regard to amicable negotiations
with indigenous communities:
Ownership and an Articulation of Property Rights
As noted in other studies (Ali 2003), the primacy of sovereignty in con-
temporary indigenous movements is often neglected by environmentalists
and developers alike. The former assume it to be synonymous with a pri-
mordial subsistence lifestyle, which most indigenous groups are happy to
move away from, while the latter assume it to be synonymous with cash
payments, which indigenous groups also find patronizing and demeaning.
Ownership is more akin with control over decisions and the legal author-
ity to occupy and manage land. This was clearly an important winning
card for the Koniambo project. While this may not be unequivocally nec-
essary for development, it can certainly make it far more amicable and
indeed more sustainable—in physical, economic, and political terms.
Transparency: Beyond Legal Disclosure
Most guidelines for corporate social responsibility nowadays include
transparency as an imperative. However, often the word is used as a
means of ensuring legal compliance with disclosure laws rather than a
genuine means of procedural openness. For indigenous communities, in
particular, transparency also has a temporal dimension. Decisions must
be taken at a pace that allows for the flow of information to be absorbed
by the community. This indeed involves additional expense for develop-
ers but should be regarded as a normal cost of doing business in order to
build trust and minimize resistance. The environmental impact assess-
ment process for Goro was perceived by the community to be hurried and
procedural rather than substantive. While inco had considerable experi-
ence working with indigenous communities such as the Innu and Inuit in
Labrador, the lessons from those interactions were not readily employed
here due to devolved regional and local management. It is essential for
companies to have collective organizational learning across business units
and operational arenas, particular in today’s Internet-savvy activist cli-
mate where comparisons are often easily drawn. Consistency of trans-
parency is thus also essential.
Flexibility of Plans: Willingness to Change
Due to a persistent legacy of colonial paternalism, indigenous communi-
ties are particularly sensitive to having plans for development imposed on
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them. Governments and developers alike have tended to present plans to
communities and ask for comments, followed by a decision that incorpo-
rates only cosmetic modifications to the original plan. Expenditures have
often already been allocated and there is systemic inflexibility in plans, no
matter how well intentioned they might be. Such a process is often unac-
ceptable to indigenous communities, who want to be part of the planning
process to decide on which scenario is workable rather than providing
comments on predetermined outcomes. The willingness of the Koniambo
developers to completely change siting decisions for the reservoir and the
refinery based on indigenous concerns helped to build trust and mutual
respect. The lesson here is that plans must be designed with inherent flex-
ibility, and options that might not be technically optimal should be con-
sidered based on social concerns that might in the long term be more con-
sequential than technical criteria.
Differentiating Impacts of Relevance to the Community
The previous point should not be taken to imply that scientific criteria,
particularly with regard to environmental impact, should be discounted
—rather they should be considered within a social context. In the Goro
case, the debate on the efficacy of submarine tailings disposal should be
considered in the context of how risks are perceived by the community
and what risks local people are willing to take. There is a temptation on
the part of developers to make such cases a scientific contest rather than
a societal decision. It is also important to recognize that environmental-
ists and indigenous communities might not always agree on the impor-
tance of particular impacts. In the New Caledonian cases many activist
groups had specific environmental concerns such as coral reef preserva-
tion. By the same token, some indigenous communities value particular
resources more than others. But because the concerns of environmental-
ists and indigenous groups are often not congruent, lumping these groups
together can be mutually divisive as well as detrimental to achieving con-
sensus on viable development plans. 
Conclusion
Indigenous communities all over the world are now beginning to assert
their right of self-determination through engagement in how their natural
resources are developed. Our study of two cases in New Caledonia
revealed the maturity of indigenous decisions in differentiating between
development plans. Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “recognition
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capital” or “symbolic capital” (1994), Horowitz has summed up these
views (and we concur), that “while financial benefits in their own right
undoubtedly interested people, their desire to receive visible, tangible
forms of recognition from the mining company actually represented a
wish for confirmation of a high social standing which was far more impor-
tant . . . than the money itself” (Horowitz 2002, 42). The perennial ques-
tions of whether economic incentives are enough to quash resistance, and
whether markets can in some way internalize social movements, miss the
complexity of contemporary indigenous movements. Rather than follow-
ing a short-term approach of jumping on the next mineral bonanza,
indigenous groups are considering their options carefully and deciding on
resistance in some cases and concessions in other cases. The challenge for
governments and developers alike is to present their case for development
most constructively and be willing to show inclusiveness, flexibility, trans-
parency, and specificity in their proposals.
Notes
1 Sarimin Boengkih explained this point to Grewal during a meeting in
Nouméa on 9 October 2002. Boengkih, the former flnks liaison in Sydney, is
now affiliated with the Agence Kanak de Development, and works with both
Corail Vivant and Action Biosphere. He is thus a very knowledgeable source on
these issues.
2 It should be noted that the results of the independence vote provided for by
the Matignon Accord would not necessarily have guaranteed an end to French
colonial rule of the islands, because at present, the largely pro-independence
Kanak only comprise 42.5 percent of the population (UN 2001, 11). The terri-
tory’s mainly pro-French European population accounts for about 37.1 percent,
and the remaining population is made up of various minority groups, including
Polynesians, Indonesians, and Vietnamese (cia 2006). 
3 Kuntz denied the existence of any major problems at Goro and maintained
that the estimated time schedule for the mine remained unchanged.
4 Napier’s letter, e-mailed from inco’s Toronto headquarters, responded to
a draft of this article. 
5 Gibaud strongly objected the notion of favorable hiring policies for Kanaks,
stating that doing so would amount to discrimination and “would be against the
French constitution.”
6 Pabouty, who was then a member of flnks, informed us of the group’s
continued efforts to ensure independent and ongoing monitoring of the mining
at Goro. 
7 The commentary by Philippe Borsa, who is a genetics specialist at the Insti-
388 the contemporary pacific • 18:2 (2006)
tute de Recherche pour le Développement (ird), was sent to us via e-mail by Syl-
vain Pabouty on 24 April 2002.
8 Borsa [2002] included the information from Corail Vivant’s analysis of
inco’s project assessment.
9 Boengkih, in an e-mail dated 12 December 2002, informed Grewal of pos-
sible delays in the overall time schedule as a result of inco’s difficulties at Goro.
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Abstract
Mineral development in remote parts of the world has become a major focus of
environmental and social resistance movements. Despite the economic benefits
that may accrue for local people, the impact of such projects is increasingly being
questioned, particularly by indigenous communities. However, there are ways by
which amicable and effective resolutions to development disagreements can be
achieved despite cultural differences between the developer and the community.
Using qualitative research methods, this article presents a comparative analysis
of two mining projects on the Pacific island of New Caledonia where the indige-
nous Kanak community has shown differentiation in their response to the two
projects. Our analysis shows that the project encountering less resistance has
more effectively embraced principles of transparency, flexibility, and indigenous
ownership. Our analysis suggests that mineral developers operating on indigenous
lands should consider the power of process in reaching agreements rather than
erroneously assuming that litigation or buyouts are inevitable. Such an approach
is likely to reach more sustainable solutions to development in remote indigenous
communities.
keywords: New Caledonia, nickel mining, smelting, decolonization, Kanak,
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